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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines in detail the previously unexamined phenomenon of
seasoned equity issuance by closed-end funds. Evidence presented here indicates that
closed-end funds issue equity at a much higher occurrence rate than is the case for regular,
operating firms in the US. Furthermore, these funds overwhelmingly use the rights offer
method o f equity floatation, which, outside the closed-end universe, has rarely been used
in the US in recent years.
The evidence produced by this study indicates that, in contrast to industrial firms,
the shares o f closed-end funds show no significant reaction to announcements o f either
rights offerings or firm commitment offerings. This is consistent with adverse selection
models o f securities issuance. However, contrary to these models, closed-end funds also
display strong price runups prior to issue, in both absolute and relative (relative to the
market) terms, as evidenced in part by significant positive movements in fund discounts in
the year prior to issue.
Closed-end fund rights offerings frequently involve nontransferable rights, an
important feature which is exceedingly rare outside the closed-end universe. This
nontransferability feature, when matched up with otherwise similar but transferable rights
offerings, affords the opportunity to test for temporary price pressure in these securities
events. Although the significant negative returns found during the offering periods are
consistent with temporary price pressure, the very weak price rebound observed after the
completion o f the offers is more supportive o f a permanent price pressure effect on the
shares o f closed-end funds that issue additional shares in equity offerings.
vi
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CHAPTER 1.
1.1

AN OVERVIEW

Introduction
This dissertation looks at what happens when a closed-end fund returns to the

capital market to raise additional capital. Closed-end funds are not unknown to financial
researchers. Numerous studies have examined many of the unique characteristics of
closed-end funds that distinguish them from regular, operating companies. Yet there is no
literature on post-IPO securities issuance by closed-end funds. This void is all the more
interesting when viewed in the light of the following facts: 1) closed-end funds are much
more likely to do seasoned equity issues than are regular operating firms, 2) when funds
do seasoned equity issues, they are much more likely than are regular firms to do so in the
form of a rights offering, a type of equity issuance that is now quite rare in the US for
operating firms, and 3) when doing rights offerings, these funds generally do so using
nontransferable rights, a type of rights offering that is virtually absent outside the closedend universe. Evidence regarding these items is presented in this study. By way of
motivating the subject, consider the first item above - the frequency of seasoned equity
issuance by closed-end funds. Although the universe of equity oriented closed-end funds
in the US is small, this group has made a relatively high number of seasoned equity
offerings in recent years. From the group of 63 US equity closed-end funds existing in
December 1990 and still trading eight years later (December 1998), there have been 64
seasoned equity offerings during that eight year period, by 41 funds. There have been an
additional 22 seasoned offerings by new funds that went public only after 1990. The

1
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prevalence of equity offerings by these funds contrasts with the incidence among regular
US operating firms. For a randomly selected sample of listed firms, Mikkelson and Partch
(1986) found that two-thirds of firms did no public offerings of any kind during their 11
year study period. By comparison, only about one-fourth of equity closed-end funds have
failed to do some type of seasoned offering in the 11 year period ending in December
1998.
The value of a fund's investment portfolio, namely, its net asset value (NAV), is
published every week. As a book value figure, the NAV is much more accurate and
meaningful than the book value of a regular operating firm. For funds, but not for
industrial firms, book value is the value of all assets, marked to current market prices.
There is very little mystery about the current value of a fund’s assets. Thus, closed-end
funds can be characterized by their relative lack of information asymmetry between
insiders (the managers) and outsiders (the fund’s investors and potential investors). Also,
the fact that funds are diversified means that the impact of any particular piece of private
information that might exist is necessarily diminished in importance.
The absence of information asymmetry leads to the possibility of using closed-end
funds as a known quantity or control group in order to study a disparate range of topics
that have been of interest in finance. Some of the many contexts in which closed-end
funds have been examined include:

2
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•

Whether two well established models of estimating the adverse selection component
of the bid-ask spread (those of Glosten and Harris (1988) and George, Kaul, and
Nimalendran (1991)) are misspecified. This question was taken up by Neal and
Wheatley (1995).

•

Arguments for and against the investor sentiment model of Delong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1990). This question is taken up by, among others, Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993).

•

Whether international stock markets and risk factors are segmented, or integrated. This
has been examined by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994).
As the above list illustrates, closed-end funds have been examined from many

angles. But, to date, there has been no research on seasoned equity issuance by these
funds. This comes despite the fact that seasoned securities issuance is a well studied
phenomenon, and, separately, most aspects of closed-end funds have been by this time
been studied.
The remainder of this chapter describes the structure of closed-end funds, and
briefly recapitulates some notable findings concerning the trading patterns of these funds.
Some important legal and regulatory considerations governing closed-end funds are
described, which again serve to distinguish funds from operating firms. The final section
outlines the organization of this dissertation.

1.2

Structure and Trading Patterns of Closed-End Funds
Closed-end funds are publicly traded investment companies whose shares trade on

a stock exchange (principally the NYSE). The value of the fund's holdings- its net asset

3
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value- is calculated and published weekly. Exchange of the fund's shares takes place not
at the NAV (as is true of open-end mutual funds), but at the current market share price.
Closed-end fund shares can, and generally do, sell at substantial discounts or premiums to
NAV. Numerous studies, including Malkiel (1977), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and
Pontiff (1995), have examined the discount/premia trading patterns of funds. There is as
yet no integrative understanding of these trading patterns. This dissertation does not
attempt to explain discounts and premia. It does, however employ discount/premia data to
aid in the empirical analysis of securities issuance by closed-end funds.
At any point in time, the cross-section of fund discounts is likely to be quite wide.
For example, for a typical week (fund discount/premia information is disseminated on a
weekly basis by some major publications, including the Wall Street Journal and the New
York Times), the week ending March 24, 1995, discounts on equity closed-end funds
ranged from a 34% discount to a 32% premium. Fund discounts also display quite
pronounced time-series movement. Fredman and Scott (1991) report on the
discount/premium ranges of a sample of 31 funds (those listed on the NYSE but targeting
their investments in foreign countries), and find that the average fund in this sample had a
52-week range of discounts/premia of greater than 40 percentage points. There is also
quite a bit of evidence that these time-series fluctuations are correlated across funds
(Bodhurtha, Kim and Lee (1995), Thompson (1978), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991a)).
The initial public offerings o f closed-end funds have also been studied. Funds
always go public at a premium, a spread between NAV and offering price being necessary
to cover underwriting and distribution expenses (paying $15 for $14 worth of assets is

4
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puzzling because there is nothing special about the fund's holdings- the assets immediately
after the time of the offering consist entirely of cash, and there are no patents, trademarks,
or innovative business operations involved). Almost invariably, the initial premium on the
fund begins to erode and within a few months turns into a discount (Weiss (1989), Peavy
(1990).
Finally, closed-end funds display significandy more volatility than their
underlying portfolios do. Sharpe and Sosin (1975) find that share price variance is 36%
greater than NAV variance. Pontiff (1993) finds share price variance to be 65% greater.
The differences in volatility are puzzling, since the fund shares and the underlying
portfolios hold identical claims to the same stream of dividends.

1.3

Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Closed-End Funds
Closed-end funds, as investment companies, are subject to the Investment

Company Act of 1940. One of the aims of that Act was to curb abusive practices by
management, including dilution of investment company shares. Accordingly, Section
23(b) prohibits the issuance of shares by investment companies at prices below net asset
value. An exception is made if an offer is made directly to existing shareholders, i.e., as a
rights offer. This rule, together with the fact that most closed-end funds have historically
traded below net asset value (meaning that any new shares issued at market prices would
be dilutive of NAV) most of the time, has resulted in rights offers being the predominant
method of issuing equity for funds.
In 1977, the SEC issued an interpretive position, Release No. IC-9932. This
position disallowed transferable rights offers by funds, unless management could make a

5
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case that a "very substantial majority" of the offer would be taken up by existing
shareholders. Additionally, nontransferable rights offers would be permissible, but only if
the size of the issue and the discount on the subscription price were such that no
substantial dilution would be suffered by nonparticipating shareholders. The effect of
these provisions appears to have been to preclude virtually any possibility of rights offers
by closed-end funds. In response to industry arguments (Phillips, 1984), the SEC changed
its position in 1985. The "substantial majority" requirement on takeup was removed and
transferable rights were henceforth allowed as long as: 1) an offer does not discriminate
among shareholders, 2) an adequate trading market exists for the transferable rights, and 3)
the allocation ratio (which is inversely proportional to the size of the issue) is at least 3:1
(thereby capping the size of the issue at one new share for every three old shares) (SEC
Response, 1985).
The first closed-end fund rights offer subsequent to the SEC's regulatory
adjustment occurred in 1989. From 1989 through 1998 there have been 88 rights offers by
equity closed-end funds. During the same time period, there were 12 firm commitment
offerings by seasoned funds. This highlights the fact that, through a combination of
regulatory constraints and managerial choice, rights offerings are the predominant method
of issuance for closed-end funds.
There are institutional reasons why closed-end funds are more likely than regular
firms to issue seasoned equity. Regular operating firms primarily use retained earnings
to achieve their expansion and investment goals. Funds, however, are bound by tax law
to distribute to shareholders substantially all realized capital gains. Thus, funds with

6
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high or even moderate portfolio turnover find it difficult to retain their "earnings".
Funds can mitigate this problem by enrolling some of their shareholders in automatic
dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). However, it remains the case for most funds that
in order for their asset base not to shrink over time, they must tap the public securities
market for new capital.

1.4

Summary
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter 2

reviews the existing body of literature on public securities issuance by seasoned firms. Of
particular relevance to this study are the implications of the choice between using a firm
commitment (underwritten) offering or a rights offering, and how that choice might affect
firm valuation not only at the time of announcement but also at the time of the actual
offering. Also, ownership structure and ownership concentration are thought to both inputs
that go into the rights versus firm commitment choice, as well as outputs that are changed
as a consequence of the choice.
In Chapter 3 this study draws out the implications, including the formulation of
testable hypotheses, of securities issuance by closed-end funds. The process of developing
this study’s sample is described in Chapter 4, along with some pertinent descriptive
statistics about the sample. In Chapter S the main empirical analysis and results are
reported. Conclusions about the findings of this dissertation are presented in Chapter 6.

7
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CHAPTER 2.
2.1

PUBLIC SECURITIES ISSUANCE

General
A wealth of literature on securities issuance by regular operating firms (including

Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986)
has established that the market reacts negatively to company announcements of seasoned
equity offerings. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a theoretical framework for this
phenomenon in terms of an adverse selection problem. Managers possess private
information about their firms' prospects, and form their own assessments of firm value,
using this private information. If the firm's shares are currently undervalued by the market
(which uses only public information to set the share price), the managers will avoid
issuing new shares. But if the market overvalues the firm, managers have an incentive to
issue new shares. Therefore, the market interprets a decision to issue seasoned equity as a
sign that the shares are overvalued, and lowers its appraisal of the firm accordingly. It is
important to note that this framework assumes that outsiders, not current shareholders, are
the purchasers of seasoned equity issues. Together with the assumption that managers act
in the interests of existing (not necessarily prospective) shareholders, this is sufficient to
induce managers to issue overvalued shares but refrain from issuing undervalued shares.
An alternative interpretation of securities issuance is given by Miller and Rock
(198S). Li that model, a firm's investment opportunities are assumed to be known by all
parties. But only management knows current earnings, i.e., the results from past
investment projects. If these earnings turn out to be higher than the market had anticipated,
cash flow will be 'positive' relative to expectations, and this positive cash flow will accrue

8
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to investors as higher than anticipated dividends. If cash flow is sufficiently negative
relative to expectations, the firm may require cash inflows in the form of unexpected
securities issuance. The size of such an issuance is important, but the form (debt, rights
offering, firm commitment equity offering) is not.
The Myers and Majluf model and the Miller and Rock model have in common that
underwriters are not assumed to be informed. Hence, underwriters play no certification
role, and do not help to bridge the information gap between management and investors.
This is in contrast to those studies, including Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter
(1986), and Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), in which underwriters do play a
certification role. The role of underwriters is of interest in the case of securities issuance
by closed-end funds. It can be conjectured that the operation and performance of these
funds may be 'transparent' enough that no certification is required (because the funds are
simply investment portfolios, and the holdings in these portfolios are publicly disclosed at
regular intervals). Indeed, it turns out that the vast majority of seasoned offerings by
closed-end funds are in fact not underwritten.
Empirical evidence is also available that seasoned equity issues are on average
preceded by a period of strong positive abnormal returns for the issuing firms (a 'runup').
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find an average excess return (over the T-bill rate) of +40.4%
for days -480 to -10 before an announcement. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990)
find an excess return of +43.8% for days -500 to -1.
Lucas and McDonald (1990) provide an explanation for this runup, hi their model,
overvalued, fairly valued, and undervalued firms all receive randomly timed positive net

9
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present value project opportunities. Delaying these projects by delaying raising the
necessary capital is costly to firms due to the possibility of lost opportunities. Overvalued
and fairly valued firms will therefore issue immediately upon project arrival (and
overvalued firms may even issue in the absence of a project, if issue costs are low
enough). Undervalued firms have an incentive to wait for their stock prices to reach more
reasonable levels. Thus, undervalued firms will experience a price runup before issuance,
while all other firms will have a flat price trend, on average. Therefore, the overall average
will show a positive runup. As in Myers and Majluf, the new equity shares are assumed to
be sold to outsiders.
Certain types of firms can be a priori characterized as having a relative absence of
information asymmetry. Utility firms, which are relatively homogeneous and highly
regulated, fit this description. For these type firms, adverse selection models would predict
an attenuated market reaction to equity issue announcements. Empirical studies show that
announcement returns for utilities are considerably less negative (though still significant)
than for industrial firms (Asquith and Mullins (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)).
Furthermore, for utility firms, since the adverse selection problem is minimal, there should
be little or no pre-announcement price runup. Asquith and Mullins find this to be the case,
in contrast to the strong runup they find for industrial firms.
It can be argued that closed-end funds, like utilities, can be characterized by a
relative absence of information asymmetry. With little information asymmetry and
minimal adverse selection, it can be anticipated that the equity issuance announcement

10
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effects and pre-announcement price behavior will be weaker (perhaps nonexistent) for
closed-end funds than for industrial firms.

2.2

Price Pressure Phenomena
Numerous studies have examined securities issuance events for evidence of either

temporary (transactions costs based) or permanent (Demand Curve) price pressure
resulting from the newly issued shares. Li addition to these issuance events, other events
examined in light of price pressure hypotheses include block trades (both secondary and
unregistered issues) and additions and deletions to the S&P 500 Index. Hansen (1988)
rinds a significant negative correlation between returns in the period before rights offer
commencement and the period after expiration, for a sample of insured US rights
offerings. Since in his sample share prices decline and then bounce back around the offer
period, Hansen interprets this as evidence of temporary price pressure. Eckbo and Masulis
(1992) find negative offering period returns for rights offers, with no bounce back. This
rinding can be viewed as supporting the permanent price pressure hypothesis. In their
study of firm commitment offerings, Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) rind no relation
between offer day returns and issue size and therefore reject the hypothesis of permanent
price pressure. Asquith and Mullins (1986) rind no significant price declines on the
issuance date for firm commitment offerings. This can be construed as evidence against
the existence of temporary price pressure during the time a securities offering is being
conducted. Hess and Frost (1982), in a study of underwritten utility offers, and Marsh
(1979), in a study of UK rights offers, reject both temporary and permanent price pressure.

11
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Both these last mentioned studies conclude that the market is liquid and that the demand
for shares is very elastic.
The announcement of changes to the S&P 500 Index is said to provide a setting to
examine price pressures without the presence of possibly confounding information effects.
Of course, unlike securities issuance studies, the supply of shares is not being changed.
Instead, there is a possible shift in the demand curve for shares. But, as in the case of
securities issuance, the evidence on price pressure from S&P Index studies is very mixed.
Shleifer (1986) finds excess returns for new S&P additions of over 3%. Since these returns
are said to be far too large to be accounted for by the transactions costs of the relevant
marginal investors, the results are attributed to a Demand Curve effect. Harris and Gurell
(1986) also find excess returns over 3%, but these are fully reversed within two weeks.
Thus, the results are attributed to temporary price pressure. Edmister, Graham, and Pirie
(1994) find fault with the estimating procedure of earlier studies in this genre, and, with
their technique, conclude that the market for shares is liquid and highly elastic, i.e., their
evidence does not support either temporary or permanent price pressure hypotheses.
What is the likely nature and extent of price pressures around the time of equity
issuance by closed-end funds? In the case of temporary, transactions costs-based pressure,
the answer is likely to depend on who the marginal investor is in these events. If the
marginal investor has low transactions costs, then temporary price pressure will be small.
For instance, Shleifer (1986) argues that large institutions are the marginal investors at the
time of S&P 500 Index changes, and that transactions costs for these institutions might be,
at most, 1% (including commissions, spreads, and market impact costs). A nearly

12
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diametrically opposed view is presented by Hansen (1988), who attributes the very large (6.41%) negative returns in the presubscription period of a sample of insured rights
offerings to transactions costs, even though he also provides evidence that most of the
issuing firms had very large capitalizations. (It would seem that the marginal investors in
these large firms are large institutions with low transactions costs). Most closed-end funds
have very small market capitalizations. The market capitalization factor by itself could
limit the activity of large institutional investors in these funds. Additionally, there is
abundant evidence (including Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and Weiss-Hanley, Lee,
and Sequin (1993)) that closed-end fund shares are held and traded overwhelmingly by
small investors. If small investors also predominate in the trading of shares around closedend fund equity issuance, then these small investors may serve as the marginal investors
during those events. As small investors, they will have relatively high transactions costs,
which could be made manifest in the form of relatively large price pressures. In other
words, closed-end fund seasoned equity issuance events may be prime candidates for
displaying transactions costs based price pressure. If other research has found evidence of
price pressure in the shares of large firms, then it is all the more likely to be evident in the
shares of small, thinly traded closed-end funds, whose shares are owned and traded
predominantly by small individual investors.
Turning to the case of permanent price pressure, the claim that permanent price
pressure should not exist in reasonably efficient financial markets rests on the supposition
that there are many arbitrarily close substitutes available for a firm’s shares. In one view,
the close substitutes argument is especially appropriate for closed-end funds. Consider the

13
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alternatives to holding shares in a given closed-end fund: 1) hold shares in any of the
several other closed-end funds in the same category (e.g., TJS General Equity Funds'), 2)
buy an actively managed open-end mutual fund instead, 3) buy an index fund (probably
reducing fees in the process), 4) build your own diversified portfolio of individual stocks.
Even if the closed-end fund in question is a foreign country fund (such funds have a
mandate to direct most of their investments to a single specific foreign country), there will
likely be several alternatives: I) buy another closed-end fund having the same focus
(often, more than one closed-end fund targets the same country or region), 2) buy an openend mutual fund targeting the same country or region, 3) buy ADR's of the country. From
this perspective, closed-end funds are highly substitutable, and should be one of the least
likely asset category to exhibit permanent price pressure.
On the other hand, closed-end funds may have a very limited clientele. Consider
some of the disadvantages of these funds: 1) there are very few funds with superior
medium or long-term relative performance, 2) volatility is much greater for fund shares
than for the NAV portfolio (Sharpe and Sosin (1975), Pontiff (1993), Hardouvelis, La
Porta, and Wizman (1994)), and most likely greater than for any reasonable substitute
asset, 3) closed-end funds will for the most part be inappropriate investment vehicles for
institutional investors because they would be delegating their investment decision
making responsibilities and incurring an extra layer of management fees. Pontiff (1993)
provides empirical evidence to support the contention that closed-end funds are, for
most purposes, redundant assets. From this perspective, if a closed-end fund issues new
shares, it may find that there is no clientele for those shares. According to this view, and

14
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in opposition to the ease-of-substitution argument in the preceding paragraph, these
funds may have the potential to exhibit pronounced Demand Curve effects in equity
issuance events.

2.3

Rights Offers
Smith (1977) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992), among others, document the relative

scarcity of rights offerings by industrial firms in the US and indicate that these offerings
had virtually ceased after about 1976. The appeal of rights offers for industrial firms has
waned in the US, despite evidence that rights offerings involve significantly lower direct
float costs than firm commitments (Smith (1977); Eckbo and Masulis (1992); Hansen
(1988)).
In the context of Miller and Rock, the decision between using rights offerings
versus firm commitment offerings is of no particular significance. The choice of debt
versus equity is also not important. Nor does it matter whether an offering is directed to
existing shareholders, or to outsiders. All that matters is the fact of the inferred fact that
there is a need for cash inflow into the firm, and the size of that inflow. All of these
choices, however, are important in the adverse selection models of Myers and Majluf
(1984) and Lucas and McDonald (1990). These models come into play to the extent that
outsiders participate in the equity offering. That is, the adverse selection problem increases
with the proportion of shares that are purchased by outsiders. In a rights offering, shares
are offered to existing shareholders, via subscription rights. If these rights are transferable,
outsiders can buy these rights and participate in the offering. For an offering in which all
the rights are exercised by current shareholders, there is no possibility of a transfer of
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wealth between current shareholders and outside parties, therefore, there is no adverse
selection problem (the stock may have been undervalued, but that just means the existing
shareholders, by subscribing to the offer, were able to increase their dollar stake in the firm
at a favorable price). For all other patterns of offer participation, the adverse selection
problem of Myers and Majluf increases in tandem with the fraction of outside
participation.
Using this logic, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) construct and then test a model where
managers choose the optimal form of equity issuance, based on their private information
about the firm. Suppose a firm's equity issue, whether it be a rights offering or a Arm
commitment, can be bought up by two groups: current shareholders, and outsiders. If the
firm knew that the entire issue would be bought up by current shareholders, then it would
issue equity even if managers considered the firm undervalued, because there would be no
transfer of wealth to outsiders, and current shareholders would suffer no dilution. On the
other hand, if managers thought outsiders would buy a significant fraction of the issue,
then they might issue when overvalued, but not when undervalued. Thus, issuance in the
form of a rights offering is perceived by the market as having only minimal adverse
selection implications, to the extent that the issue is expected to be taken up by current
shareholders, hi actual practice, the 'takeup' can be signaled, even before the issue, by
managers who obtain and make public the precommitments of large shareholders to
subscribe to the rights offer. Firms that cannot obtain such precommitments (i.e., expected
takeup is low) must do a “standby” rights offering, in which an underwriter commits to
buy up and place all unsubscribed shares. The standby rights offer thus implies more of an
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adverse selection problem, and the market reaction is more negative than an uninsured
offering. The strongest negative reaction is reserved for firm commitment offers, where
the expected takeup is assumed to be near zero, i.e., the firm is overvalued. Thus Eckbo
and Masulis assign places for uninsured and standby rights offers in the pecking order of
security issuance that runs the spectrum from risk-free debt to bank debt to risky public
debt to rights offers to firm commitments.
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) develop a model slightly different than Eckbo and
Masulis. The lowest quality firms issue via firm commitment offerings (as in Eckbo and
Masulis). But the highest quality firms choose insured (standby) rights offers (not
uninsured rights offers). Standbys involve an 'insurance' fee for the contingent
underwriting activity, but this insurance is fairly priced and observable, so it carries no
adverse selection implications. Furthermore, standbys entail certification by an
underwriter, a positive signal lacking in uninsured offerings.
Consider that even an uninsured rights offering will be fully subscribed if the
subscription price is set sufficiently low. hi the pure theory of rights offers (ignoring
adverse selection considerations), the subscription price is irrelevant- it cannot affect firm
value. In the model of Heinkel and Schwartz, subscription price is irrelevant for insured
offerings. The firm buys insurance in lieu of setting an arbitrarily low subscription price,
but this insurance is fairly priced. For uninsured offerings, however, the market infers
value from the level at which the subscription price is set - the lower the subscription
price, the lower the market should set its appraisal of the company’s value. Management is
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said to set the price low enough so that any bad news that might be released before the
offering will not cause the offer to fail.
Consistent with their predictions, Eckbo and Masulis find no significant
announcement effect for uninsured rights offerings by industrial firms, a small but
significantly negative -1.0 % for standbys, and the usual -3% for firm commitment equity
offerings. This compares to the two-day announcement abnormal return of -2.61% found
by Hansen (1988) for a sample of industrial standby rights offerings, and -1% found by
White and Lusztig (1980) for a combined sample of standby and uninsured rights
offerings by industrial and utility firms.
The finding by Eckbo and Masulis of no negative market reaction to uninsured
rights offering is not supported by Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (1999). The latter authors find,
for a sample of British rights offerings between 1986 and 1994, an average -2.90%
negative excess return upon announcement of insured rights offerings but a -4.90%
response to uninsured offerings. Uninsured offerings are associated with larger
subscription price discounts. Controlling for the choice between insured and uninsured
rights offerings, they find the discount (which is known at announcement time) to be
negatively related to announcement period returns. That is, the larger the discount, the
more negative the announcement returns.
hi the model of Eckbo and Masulis, an undervalued firm can avoid the adverse
selection problem by choosing an uninsured rights offer (if only current shareholders
subscribe to the offer, then only these shareholders benefit from the undervaluation), hi
particular, the firm can avoid having to delay issuance until its share price has runup to
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more reasonable levels. Thus, there will be no runup, on average, for firms that choose
uninsured rights offers. Consistent with their model, Eckbo and Masulis find no price
runup for uninsured rights, a small runup (44.57%) for standbys, and a larger runup
(4-12%) for firm commitments, for the three months before announcement. They also find
significant negative abnormal returns of about -4% during the subscription offer period of
uninsured offerings, which typically lasts about three weeks. Possible reasons for these
negative returns are given as: 1) the compensation required by investors for rearranging
their portfolios (this is the 'transactions costs' version of the price pressure hypothesis), and
2) "the fact that the primary market, where there are no purchaser-bome fees, draws buyers
away from the secondary market".
Marsh (1979) examines a sample of UK rights offers. He finds a very small (0.9%) but significant price pressure effect on returns during the offer period. But a
subsequent bounceback, along with the fact that the negative offer period returns are not
related to issue size, suggests again a transactions cost based, temporary price pressure
effect, hi contrast to the model of Eckbo and Masulis, he finds a very large (4-30%) price
runup in the 12 months before the rights offers.
Several observations are in order with regard to the institutional setting of
securities issuance by closed-end funds. First, the method of equity issuance (rights offer
or firm commitment) probably does not have the same signal content as it would for
industrial firms. During the time of the study period, the vast majority of funds would have
been precluded by SEC regulations from conducting firm commitment offers, as fund
share prices tended to trade below NAV. Also, the Eckbo and Masulis concept o f using
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precommitments as a signal of the offer’s takeup does not appear to apply to closed-end
funds, hi general, as discussed below, these funds lack institutional holders and
blockholders, whose role in the Eckbo and Masulis model is to make the necessary
precommitments. Finally, though a thorough search was not conducted, it appears that
closed-end funds do not issue public debt. The Investment Company Act caps the
allowable leverage of closed-end funds at 25% of total capitalization. Perusal of fund
annual reports indicates that funds in fact carry virtually no debt. Closed-end fund
shareholders still carry debt to the extent that the companies in the fund's investment
portfolio are leveraged. It can be conjectured that funds choose not to use further leverage
in an effort to appeal to the broadest possible clientele.
There is no literature on nontransferable rights, for either closed-end funds or
firms in general. The majority of rights offerings in this study involved nontransferable
rights. Nontransferable rights also are used by regular operating firms in the US, but
they apparently constitute less than a majority of rights offers (Moody's). SEC
regulations would seem to dictate the use of nontransferable rights for at least some
closed-end fund offerings. This is due to the requirement that transferable rights must
have an adequate trading market. The value of a transferable right is determined by
arbitrage between the rights price and the share price. The rights price is directly related
to the size of the issue and to the discount on the offer subscription price. If the discount
is small or the relative size of the issue is small, the value of the rights will be too small
(i.e. the rights may be worth only a fraction of a dollar) to make an effective market in
the rights, and management may feel compelled to use nontransferable rights instead.
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2.4

Ownership Structure and Concentration
The ownership structure of this study's sample is of interest in light of the findings

of Hansen and Pinkerton (1982). For a sample of 54 US rights offerings (offerings by
operating firms, not closed-end funds) from 1971 to 1979, they find that insiders or single
blockholders own a 61% stake, on average, before issuance. For a Arm where most of the
shares are held by a very few shareholders, the distribution costs of an equity offer should
be low, and there is no reason to pay for the distribution capabilities of an underwriter.
The authors contend that firms with diffuse ownership will find it cheaper to employ an
underwriter than to distribute the shares internally (via a rights offer). Thus, in general,
highly concentrated firms will choose rights offerings, while diffusely held firms will
choose firm commitment offerings. Another aspect of high ownership concentration is that
monitoring is presumably done effectively by the blockholders, reducing the need for
external certification by underwriters. This diminishes one of the theoretical advantages of
an underwritten offer, and makes a rights offering relatively more advantageous.
Hansen and Pinkerton analyze only the direct costs associated with a rights
offering. Kothare (1997) maintains, and provides evidence for, the contention that the
indirect costs of rights and firm commitment offerings are much larger and of a more
lasting duration. In a before-and-after issuance analysis, she finds that rights offerings
decrease the liquidity of a firm’s shares, post-event Since the rights offering is marketed
by design to the firm’s existing shareholders, and, as it turns out, the takeup is skewed
toward those who already have the largest stakes, the result is that ownership
concentration is increased. With higher ownership concentration there is less trading
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liquidity. Kothare finds that percentage bid-ask spreads increase significantly after rights
offers. Higher bid-ask spreads mean higher trading costs. Investors require compensation
in the form of higher expected returns, which implies a lower value for the firm. Firm
commitment offerings, on the other hand, have the effect (Kothare reports) of broadening
the firm’s ownership. She finds that bid-ask spreads significantly decrease for firms that
do firm commitment offerings. This would imply a higher value for the firm. Thus, while
rights offerings may have lower direct costs, they also entail higher indirect costs, while
firm commitment offerings entail indirect benefits. Kothare contends that the heavy
predominance of firm commitment over rights offerings in the US is explainable in terms
of these ownership concentration and trading cost phenomena.
In Eckbo and Masulis (1992), firm managers are said to be able to signal the
eventual takeup of a rights offer by divulging the precommitments of outside
blockholders. This scheme, of course is contingent upon there being sufficient
blockholdings in the firm's ownership. Evidence in this regard in presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3.

3.1

IM PLICATIONS O F SECURITES ISSUANCE BY
CLOSED-END FUNDS

Implications for Pre-announcem ent and Announcement Period R eturns
Under a standard interpretation o f the Semi-Strong Form Efficient Market

Hypothesis, managers o f mutual funds hold no information about securities that is not also
known by the market. This assertion is supported by the many studies (dating back to
Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968)) showing that mutual fund managers as a group fail to
outperform the market. This implies that neither closed-end fund managers nor open-end
fund managers hold any nonpublic information. Some researchers have even taken it as
axiomatic that there is no information asymmetry in closed-end funds (see Peavy, 1990).
For instance, Simon and Wheatley (1995) test some established models of the adverse
selection component in bid-ask spreads using closed-end fund spreads as a control group
for which there should be no adverse selection component. Adverse selection is said to be
minimal because both managers and the public can observe the value o f the fund's
underlying portfolio. This value is the NAV, which is published weekly. Also, the fact that
funds are diversified means that the impact o f any particular piece o f private information
is necessarily mitigated.
The managers o f closed-end funds have the ability to raise new equity in the public
securities market. What inferences should the market draw when managers do this? From
the perspective o f Myers and Majluf, since there is no asymmetric information between
the market and fund managers, the markets should view the event as being neutral. This
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conclusion applies whether the issue involves a debt issue, a rights offering, or a firm
commitment offering. Closed-end funds should exhibit no significant abnormal returns at
the time of issue announcement. From a Miller and Rock perspective, the firm's important
information releases are unexpected dividends and unexpected external financing. But for
closed-end funds, dividends are largely dictated by investment portfolio performance and
tax statutes. Investment performance is readily observable by shareholders, in the form of
weekly published NAV figures. Thus it seems that an external financing event would
impart very little relevant information to the market.
In the offering prospectuses of closed-end funds, there are several reasons given
for why a seasoned equity offering may be beneficial for shareholders. By expanding the
asset base, fund managers are said to be able to take advantage of attractive new
investment opportunities, without having to sell off current holdings. A larger asset base
achieves economies of scale, perhaps allowing lower expense ratios. And in the case of
rights offerings, shareholders can enlarge their holdings at a 'discounted' price, without
having to pay commission costs. It is also usually noted in the prospectus that an offering,
by expanding the asset base, will have the effect of increasing the dollar amount of the
compensation paid to the management firm.
How does the pre-announcement price path model of McDonald and Lucas (1990)
apply to closed-end funds? In their model, if information asymmetry between a firm and
the market is small, so too is the magnitude of possible undervaluation. Modest
undervaluation or overvaluation would not be an important factor for managers choosing
the frequency or timing of equity issues. On average for this small-asymmetry group, there
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should be no price runup before equity issues. We would, however, expect closed-end
equity issues to cluster around periods of large returns for the US market (i.e., large
absolute returns). For stocks in general (and, by extension, for the special category
consisting of closed-end funds), both the model of Lucas and McDonald and the empirical
findings of Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) find that seasoned equity issues are
on average accompanied by large runups in the US market, hi summary, closed-end fund
equity issues should be associated with runups in the US market, but not with runups by
the funds relative to the US market. As for post-issue performance, this is an open
question. In general, the securities issuance literature indicates that issuing firms issue new
shares after market runups, but quite often the market continues to run up after issuance. In
this sense, firm managers cannot be said to have 'timing' ability.
hi contrast to the Lucas and McDonald model, the investor sentiment hypothesis
can be viewed as leading to somewhat different implications concerning closed-end fund
equity issues and pre-announcement price runups. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) draw
as an implication of the investor sentiment model that IPO's for new closed-end funds will
coincide with an average narrowing of discounts in the closed-end industry. The
narrowing of discounts is said to reflect positive sentiment on the part of sentiment
investors and this leads to excess returns for closed-end funds relative to the US market.
Positive sentiment also makes the market receptive to IPO's of new funds, and
entrepreneurs exploit these opportunities. Lee et al. find that the closed-end industry’s
value-weighted average discount narrows by 7 percentage points for years in which new
funds go public, compared to years in which no funds go public (during their study period,
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the closed-end fund universe was much smaller, so that it was not unusual for there to be
no new funds launched in a given year).
It may be that investor sentiment influences closed-end fund seasoned equity
issues (a phenomenon which has never been studied) as well as the IPO's by these funds
(which have been studied). The same positive sentiment that allows new funds to be
floated may also allow managers of existing funds to float additional shares. Of the 71
seasoned equity issues in this study (60 rights offerings and 11 firm commitments), 57
occurred during the 1992-94 period. This same period saw an approximately 50% increase
in the number of equity closed-end funds, with 45 new funds going public. Arguably,
favorable valuations, possibly driven by investor sentiment, influenced both phenomena.
Evidence would come in the form of significant positive movements in the
discounts/premia, on a fund by fund basis, during the time leading up to issue
announcement, for those funds that did seasoned equity issues. That is, if a fund
announces a seasoned issue, we should be able to look back and see a positive movement
in its discount/premium series leading up to the announcement. And, because total returns
on fund shares are determined in part by discount movements, in the pre-announcement
period we should also observe abnormal returns (price runups) for the sample of issuing
funds, relative to the US market. Again, this investor sentiment prediction is in contrast to
the predictions about closed-end funds that would follow from the adverse selection
literature.
The investor sentiment model has no strong implications for the returns to be
expected upon announcement of a closed-end fund equity issue. Sentiment may have
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carried a fund’s price higher before an issue, but there is nothing in the model to say that
sentiment would reverse (causing negative announcement returns) immediately upon
notice of an impending issue. The investor sentiment model does not lead to any
hypothesis about the announcement effects of closed-end fund equity issues.
In contrast, adverse selection models do lend themselves to a prediction about
announcement effects of closed-end equity issues. The adverse selection model makes an
exception for its own rule that securities issuance is always bad news. The exception is
that if there is very little information asymmetry, there will be very little market reaction.
As discussed above, if the market is efficient, closed-end funds should be associated with
a virtual absence of

information asymmetry. Therefore, a finding of no significant

announcement effects for closed-end fund issuance would tend to confirm the adverse
selection model.
The testable hypotheses developed thus far are as follows:
Hypothesis #1
Ho: In the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds
show no significant price runup, relative to the US market.
Ha: hi the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds
show a significantly positive price runup, relative to the US market.
Hypothesis #2
Ho: In the year prior to announcement of a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds
show no significant movement in their discount/premium.
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H,: In the year prior to announcement o f a seasoned equity issue, closed-end funds
show a significantly positive movement in their discount/premium.
Hypothesis #3
H0: There is no significant market reaction to the announcement o f seasoned
equity issues by closed-end funds.
H,: There is a significantly negative market reaction to the announcement o f
seasoned equity issues by closed-end funds.

3.2

Implications for Offering Period Returns
Marsh (1979), Hansen (1988), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) all find evidence o f

a price pressure effect around the offering period of rights offers (again, using samples o f
regular operating firms). These studies find negative returns during the offering period, or
in the period after announcement and running through the offer period, and positive
returns in a period after expiration o f the offer. An exception is Eckbo and Masulis, who
find the negative offering period returns but no bounceback after the offer.
In the price pressure literature (including Scholes (1972), Kraus and Stoll (1972),
Dann, Mayers, and Raab (1977), and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)), two types o f price
pressure are discussed most frequently. Temporary price pressure is said to occur because
the buyers o f blocks of shares require a price concession to compensate for the transaction
costs o f rearranging their portfolios. Prices return to normal once the block has been
placed. CBlocks' here include the placement o f a large number o f shares via a rights
offering or a primary or secondary firm commitment offering, in which, generally, the
block is split between many buyers.) The second type o f price pressure is o f a more
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permanent nature. It is associated with the hypothesis from Scholes of a downwardsloping demand curve for a firm's shares. To the extent that there is no perfect substitute
for a firm's shares, incrementally placed shares are priced according to a downwardsloping demand curve (in contrast to the ideal in finance of a perfectly elastic demand
curve). Thus, a seasoned equity issue causes a permanent downward adjustment in a firm's
share price.
Consider how price pressure may relate to rights offerings. If temporary price
pressure is present, there will be negative abnormal returns during the offering period, and
a recovery after the offer expires. If permanent price pressure is present, the price recovery
will be absent, or will be smaller in magnitude than the negative offering period returns
(i.e., if there is both a temporary and a permanent effect, the recovery will be only partial).
But, according to Eckbo and Masulis, it is difficult to distinguish between permanent and
temporary effects in rights offerings using tests for price reversal. Such tests lack power:
the events lack a common event-window size, since offer period durations vary from
rights offer to rights offer.
Notwithstanding Eckbo and Masulis, there may be another way to distinguish
between permanent and temporary price pressure effects in rights offerings. The sample in
this study has both transferable and nontransferable rights offerings. In a nontransferable
offer, to the extent that the offered shares are placed, they must be taken up by existing
shareholders. Shareholders must subscribe or suffer dilution. The amount of dilution (in
percentage terms) a shareholder can suffer is a function of both the size of the issue and
the percentage discount on the offer's subscription price. In contrast, in a transferable offer,
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a shareholder who does not wish to subscribe for additional shares can sell his rights on
the market. There are transactions costs involved in selling rights, but those costs are likely
to be much lower than the costs facing the shareholder in a nontransferable offer. For the
shareholder who lacks a transferable right, transactions costs could include selling off
unwanted shares, or selling other holdings to raise money for the subscription. (To give a
numerical example that is typical of rights offerings, the shareholder who does not wish to
participate in a transferable rights offering can seal his N rights at, say, $0.75 per right.
But the unwilling shareholder in a nontransferable offering must sell N shares at, say, $15
per share). All of these costs could lead to temporary price pressure, and the higher the
transactions costs, the greater the temporary price pressure. All of this is consistent with
the evidence that Hansen (1988) supplies: (transferable) rights offers impose higher
transactions costs on nonparticipating shareholders than firm commitment offerings do. If
that is true, then it is a simple extension to say that nontransferable offerings impose even
greater costs on nonparticipating shareholders.
On the other hand, if an equity issue is to have a permanent, demand-curve effect
on share price, it should not matter what the mechanics of the rights are or how the takeup
occurs (the takeup could be by existing shareholders, new investors, or a combination).
That is, whether the rights are transferable or nontransferable should not affect the price.
And transactions costs are not important in permanent price pressure. Only the size of the
issue matters. Since the issuing firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the greater
the number of new shares that are issued, the lower the market clearing price will be for
those shares.
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If the price pressure is temporary and driven by transactions costs, then
nontransferable offerings should have a larger price impact than transferable offerings,
since the former involve higher transactions costs. Furthermore, the amount of price
pressure in a transferable offering will be relatively insensitive to the size of the issue. This
is because nonparticipating shareholders can just as easily (and at about the same dollar
cost) sell their rights in a large-sized offering as they can in a small offering. Contrast this
to the strategy of a shareholder in a nontransferable offering who simply wishes to
maintain his pre-existing holdings. The shareholder could sell shares before the ex-rights
day (thereby losing the right to subscribe to the issue), then buy them back on the open
market during the offer period. This would involve two market transactions, with
commissions and bid-ask spreads. A possibly less costly strategy would be to hold the
shares until after the ex-rights day (thereby retaining the right to subscribe to the offer),
then sell N shares on the open market during the offering period while also subscribing to
buy N shares (the shareholder’s full allotment under the offer), so as to finish with the
same holdings as before the event. The transactions costs here would be proportional to the
size of the offering (the offer size determines how many shares need to be sold off to
maintain the investor’s pre-offer position). The third option would be to do nothing, and
absorb the dilution. But the amount of potential dilution, and therefore the transactions
costs one is willing to absorb in order to avoid the dilution, is proportional to both the offer
size and the offer discount. Using the mean subscription price discount of 10.9% (see
Table 3, discussed in Chapter 4) and the mean offer size (see Table 4) for nontransferable
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rights offerings, a typical dilution from nonparticipation can be calculated as slightly more
than 2%.
hi summary, if the price pressure in rights offerings is of the permanent, demandcurve variety, then there should be negative returns during the offer period, with no
reversal in the post-expiration period. Also, there should be no difference in offer period
returns between transferable and nontransferable offers, controlling for issue size. By
contrast, if the price pressure if of the temporary, transactions-cost variety, there would be
a price rebound after expiration. Also, nontransferable issues should have stronger
negative returns during the offer period, controlling for issue size. Finally, the offering
period returns of nontransferable issues, but not necessarily those of transferable issues,
will be negatively related to the product of relative issue size and relative subscription
discount. The competing hypotheses are as follows, with the null hypotheses being
associated with permanent price pressure and the alternative hypotheses favoring
temporary price pressure:
Hypothesis #4:
Ho: There are no significantly positive returns in the period immediately following
the expiration of closed-end fund rights offerings.
Ha: There are significantly positive returns in the period immediately following the
expiration of closed-end fund rights offerings.
Hypothesis #5:
Ho: There is no difference between transferable and nontransferable rights
offerings in the average returns during the offer period, controlling for issue size.
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H,: Average returns during the offer period are significantly more negative for
nontransferable than for transferable issues, controlling for issue size.
Hypothesis #6:
H„: There is no relation between the offer period returns for nontransferable rights
and the 'dilution potential', defined as the product o f relative issue size and relative
subscription discount.
H,: There is a significantly negative relation between the offer period returns for
nontransferable rights and the 'dilution potential', defined as the product o f
relative issue size and relative subscription discount

3.3

Implications for Ownership Concentration
Kothare (1997) provides evidence that rights offerings increase ownership

concentration and decrease trading liquidity, especially when contrasted with firm
commitment offerings, which have the opposite effects on ownership concentration and
trading liquidity. Are these findings applicable to equity offerings by closed-end funds?
This dissertation reports on, in Chapter 5, changes in trading volume for funds that
did rights offerings, where trading volume is measured at a point in time 12 months
before, then 12 months after, the issuance event (so as not to conflate the before and after
trading characteristics with trading in the actual event period). Similar volume data was
collected and tested for each of the funds that did firm commitment offerings. Significant
decreases in trading volume for rights offering funds and increases for the firm
commitment funds would be supportive o f Kothare’s argument about the differential
effect o f the two types o f offerings on ownership concentration.
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A more direct measure of changes in ownership concentration is also conducted:
changes in the total percentage of share held by institutions in each closed-end fund, 12
months pre- and post-issuance. Kothare uses blockholdings and insider ownership instead
of institutional holdings, but, as described in Chapter 4, closed-end funds have negligible
quantities of those two variables.
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CHAPTER 4.
4.1

SAMPLE DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS

Sample Development
This study uses a sample of 97 seasoned equity issues, which comprises all but

three o f the issues that were done by all equity closed-end funds from 1986 through 1998.
Three rights offerings were excluded because they entailed an initial announcement,
followed by long periods approaching a year before the actual offerings got underway.
Such long periods could not be reconciled with the estimation period used in the main
event study. O f these 97 equity issues in the final sample, 85 were in the form o f rights
offerings, while 12 were firm commitment offerings.
Closed-end fund rights offerings were identified by examining the Subscription
Rights section o f the Moody's Dividend Record, for all years from 1986 to 1995. For
offerings after 1995, a search o f the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR
database was conducted. Firm commitment offerings were identified in the Standard &

Poors Corporation Records and the Dow Jones News Retrieval service.
Offerings by nonequity closed-end funds, including bond funds, 'dual' funds (dual
funds have two classes of shares: capital and income), and convertible funds were
excluded from the sample.
Most o f the terms o f the rights offers (such as allocation ratios, subscription prices,
record dates, and expiration dates) were available from both Moody's and Dow Jones
News Retrieval. Announcement dates and times were located on the DJ News Retrieval.
Wire announcements were found for all 60 o f the rights offers through 1994. For the rights
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offers from 1995 through 1998, the announcement dates were taken from the funds’
registrations filings (the filings always included language such as “the fund announced the
offering after the close o f trading on October 2,1995”). No announcement could be found
for two o f the 14 firm commitment offers, leaving a sample o f 12 such offers. For rights
offers, in general, the initial wire announcement contains the offer's allocation ratio (the
inverse o f the issue size), but no exact subscription price or record date. All events in the
rights sample were identified in the initial announcement as to whether transferable or
nontransferable rights would be used to conduct the offering.
Daily returns were obtained from CRSP. Weekly data on closed-end fund
discounts and premia was obtained from the Wall Street Journal (via the Dow Jones News
Retrieval), and, for some o f the foreign-invested funds, from David Muller, editor o f the

Foreign Markets Advisory.
Data on institutional share holdings and on fund trading volumes was collected
from both the Moody’s Handbook o f Common Stock and the Standard & Poors Stock
Guide.

4.2

Descriptive Statistics
Panel A o f Table 1 shows the distribution o f rights offers by year. Panel B o f

Table 1 is a complete list o f the firm commitment offers. Table 2 shows the mean and
median closing share prices and market capitalizations, as o f event day announcement, for
the sample o f rights offers, and, separately, for the sample o f firm commitment offers.
Table 2 suggests that the firms in the sample can be characterized as “small cap”, by most
reasonable definitions. Table 3 shows some summary statistics for the subscription price
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Table 1 - Time Distribution of Equity Offerings

Panel A: Frequency of rights offerings, by year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

1
2
3
9
24
19
14
6
3
4

Total

85~

Panel B: List of closed-end fund firm commitment offerings

Fund

Record Date

Argentina Fund
Austria Fund
Germany Fund
Japan OTC Equity Fund
Korea Fund
Korea Fund
Korea Fund
Morgan Stanley Emerging
Markets Fund
Taiwan Fund
Taiwan Fund
Taiwan Fund
Taiwan Fund

3/17/94
2/23/90
12/04/89
6/02/94
5/23/86
8/10/89
11/18/93
3/09/94
5/26/88
3/07/90
12/07/93
5/03/96
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Table 2 - Market Capitalization Characteristics of Sample Firms on Announcement
Day

Panel A: Rights offering sample
Mean share price
Median share price
Mean market capitalization ($ millions)
Median market capitalization ($ millions)

17.49
13.63
302.50
165.49

Panel B: Firm commitment offering sample
Mean share price
Median share price
Mean market capitalization ($ millions)
Median market capitalization ($ millions)

24.39
22.88
209.33
115.85
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Table 3-Rights issues: subscription price relative discounts
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

transferable
riahts offerinas
0.1746
0.0139
34
0
54
2.557
0.007
1.674
0.013
2.005

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

nontransfer-able
riahts offerinas
0.1152
0.0068
51

Table 4-Relative size of rights issues
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

transferable
riahts offerinas
0.2945
0.0040
34
0
69
2.310
0.012
1.667
0.024
1.995

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

nontransfer-able
riahts offerinas
0.2340
0.0289
51
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discount on transferable and nontransferable rights offers (the mean value of 0.1746 for
transferable offerings means that those offerings had a subscription price that discounted
by an average of 17.46% from the market price). Table 4 shows similar statistics for issue
size. The subscription discount is significantly larger for transferable issues than for
nontransferable issues. Issue size is also significantly larger for transferable issues. There
are S1 nontransferable rights issues in the sample, and 34 transferable issues.
Of the 85 rights offerings, 78 were fully subscribed. The mean subscription rate
was 96%.
Rights offerings can be insured or uninsured (insured offerings are often called
'standby' offerings). In a standby offering, an underwriter contracts to step in, if necessary,
to purchase and place all unsubscribed shares. After examining the wire announcements of
all rights offers in the sample, and also a representative group of 19 offer prospectuses, it
appears that there are no standby offers. All of the offers in the sample are uninsured. This
stands to reason, in light of the prohibition against equity offers to the public at prices
below NAV. If an offer would otherwise fail, and an underwriter steps in and places the
shares in the open market, this would constitute a public sale of shares below NAV,
running afoul of the Investment Company Act.
As discussed previously, the special regulatory setting of closed-end funds seems
to account for the prevalence of rights offerings (as opposed to firm commitment
offerings). Yet it may be that fund insiders also favor rights offerings because it allows
them to increase their proportional holdings in the fund (by exercising their rights, buying
additional rights, and exercising their oversubscription privileges), and therefore their
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control. But the evidence indicates otherwise. Of the 31 sample funds existing as of
December, 1990, only four funds had insider (defined as officers, trustees, and directors)
holdings of 1% or more, and only 2 had holdings of 2% or more (Herzfeld, 1992).
Blockholdings do not appear to be present in the closed-end fund sample. Of the
31 funds in the rights offerings sample that were in existence as of December, 1990, only
two out of 12 domestically-invested funds had 5% blockholders, and only five of 19
foreign-invested funds had 5% blockholders (Herzfeld, 1992). This is consistent with the
domestic closed-end fund sample of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and the foreign fund
sample of Bekaert and Urias (1996). Both studies characterize fund share ownership as
diffuse and dominated by small individual investors, with a dearth of institutional
holdings.
In summary, it appears that funds conducting seasoned equity offerings, like the
mutual fund industry in general, have only negligible insider holdings. Looking at both
insider holdings and outside block holdings, it appears that, while other aspects of
ownership characteristics may be important for closed-end funds, insider and
blockholdings are not.
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CHAPTER 5.
5.1

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Pre-issuance Price Runup
In the discussion in Chapter 3 on securities' issuance under adverse selection, it

was hypothesized that closed-end fund seasoned equity issues on average are preceded by
a period of robust US market returns. But relative to the US market, the issuing funds
would display only a flat price trend. These predictions are conjectured as extensions of
the empirical findings that utilities do not have pre-issue runups (Asquith and Mullins
(1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)), and the common characteristic of utilities and closedend funds: minimal information asymmetry. The investor sentiment model, on the other
hand, can be viewed as saying that fund equity issues follow periods o f superior fund
performance. In particular, the pre-issuance period will be associated with a narrowing of
discounts (or widening of premia).
Table 5 compares the total cumulative return o f issuing funds and o f the valueweighted CRSP index during the year leading up to announcement o f a fund equity
issuance. If fundj announces a rights or firm commitment offering on, say, June 30,1993,
then the cumulative return o f the fund in the year ending June 29,1993 is calculated, as is
the return on the value-weighted CRSP index over the same period. Pairs o f one year
returns are collected like this for every closed-end fund equity issuance event
For the combined sample o f rights and firm commitment offerings, the one year
unadjusted return for issuing funds is +28.6%, compared to +17.0% for the valueweighted CRSP. For the subsample o f 85 rights offers, the means are +25.3% (funds) and
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Table 5-U nadjusted m ean cum ulative retu rn s for the y ear preceding closed-end fund equity issue announcements.
(Mean returns and Difference-in-Means tests: two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance)

All rights & firm commitment offerings (N=97)

M ean
Variance
O bservations

Issuing
funds
sample

VWCRSP
Index

0.2856
0.1138
97

0.1696
0.0098
97

Rights offerings (N=85)

M ean
Variance
Observations

Firm commitment offerings (N=12)

Rights
offerings
sample

VWCRSP
Index

0.2530
0.1081
85

0.1730
0.0093
85

M ean
V ariance
Observations

Firm
commit.
sample

VWCRSP
Index

0.5160
0.1017
12

0.1455
0.0133
12

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

0

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

w

n

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

0

df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

112
3.248
0.001
1.659
0.002
1.981

df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

98
2.152
0.017
1.661
0.034
1.984

df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

14
3.785
0.001
1.761
0.002
2.145

+17.3% (CRSP). For the firm commitment subsample, the means are +51.69% (funds)
and +14.6% (CRSP). Difference in means tests between issuing funds and market
returns are highly significant for all three pairwise comparisons (full sample: 1%
significance level, rights offering subsample: 5%, and firm commitment subsample:
1%). It appears that the hypothesis o f flat relative performance (relative to the US
market) can be rejected. Note that the average contemporaneous one year US market
returns (as proxied by the value-weighted CRSP) that precede fund equity issues, at
17.0%, were fairly typical o f annualized US stock market returns during the 1989-98
period, but larger than the long term compounded US market return o f about 10-11%.
Depending on the perspective, fund equity issues appear to have followed either periods
o f "average" returns on the US market, or "large" returns on the market. It is possible
that fund managers timed equity issues to occur after fund runups, not after market
runups. Evidence touching on this question is presented in Table 6. In contrast to pre
issue performance, results from the first 100 trading days after issue announcement
provide little evidence that funds were able to do anything more than match the US
market performance. Whether or not it was by design on the part o f fund managers, the
timing o f equity issues appears to coincide with the cresting o f fund performance
relative to US market performance.

5.2

Event Study for Periods Around Issuance
For 85 closed-end fund rights offerings, estimates o f average abnormal stock

returns were made for each o f the following 7 periods of interest: a 60-day
preannouncement period; a 2-day announcement period; a period after announcement but
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Table 6-Unadjusted mean cumulative returns for the first 100 trading days after closed-end fund equity issue announcments.
(Mean returns and Difference-in-Means tests: two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance)
All rights & firm commitment offerings (N=97)

Mean
Variance
O bservations

Issuing
funds
sample
0.0009
0.0502
97

Rights offerings (N=85)

VWCRSP
Index
0.0394
0.0040
97

M ean
V ariance
O bservations

Firm commitment offerings (N=12)

Rights
offerings
sample
-0.0060
0.0305
85

VWCRSP
Index
0.0404
0.0039
85

Mean
Variance
Observations

Firm
commit.
sample
0.0498
0.2021
12

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

o

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

o

Hypothesized
M ean Difference

A
U

df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

111
-1.633
0.053
1.659
0.105
1.982

df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

105
-2.311
0,011
1.659
0.023
1.983

df
t S ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

12
0.131
0.449
1.782
0.898
2.179

VWCRSF
Index
0.0326
0.0053
12

before the offer begins; the starting day of the offering period; the offering period, less
starting and expiration days; the expiration day of the offer; and a 5-day post-expiration
period. The event study methodology is patterned after Eckbo and Masulis (1992). But
while that study used an estimation period weighted toward post event returns, this
dissertation employs an estimation period from 300 days before announcement to 100
days after announcement.
Table 7 shows the abnormal returns estimates for the full sample of 85 rights
offers (in Panel A), and for three subsamples: nontransferable rights offerings (Panel B),
transferable rights offerings (Panel C), and a subsample that excludes those offerings for
which there was a previous rights or firm commitment offering by the same closed-end
fund (Panel D). The sample was split into transferable and nontransferable subsamples to
examine possible effects of nontransferability, a feature of rights offerings that has never
been examined before. In particular, there may be more adverse selection implications
associated with nontransferable offerings, since these offers are more coercive of
shareholders. On the other hand, nontransferability guarantees that, to the extent the offer
is subscribed, it is subscribed by existing shareholders, possibly ameliorating transfer of
wealth problems with outside parties. Also, as discussed above, it is assumed that
nontransferable issues involve higher transactions costs for nonparticipating shareholders
(who may be forced to subscribe and then to dump unwanted shares). This could lead to
greater temporary price pressure. Finally, 'repeat' events were excluded (Panel D) to try to
isolate those offerings having the most potential for imparting new information to the
market.
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Table 7-Percent average abnorm al stock retu rn s fo r 7 event periods around issue announcements.
Regression model is E q(l), int ext. Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant at the 5% level, and *♦, at the 1% level.

_________Event Period_____
60-day pre
announcem ent
period
P anel A: All rights offerings (N - 85)
% a v e ra g e abnorm al return
z-value
% of sam ple negative
A verage days in period

1.41
0.67
32.9
60

2-day
announcem ent
period

Offer period,
Offer expiration
Pre-offer period Offer start day less start, end
day
days

5-day post
expiration
period

-0.14
-0.49
50.6
2

-1.19
-1.46
57.6
33.5

-0.29
-1.08
61.2
1

-4.18
-5.78**
85.9
18.5

0.33
1.56
49.4
1

0.97
2.52*
34.1
4.9

0.40
1.23
39.2
2

-2.13
-1.93
66.7
35.1

-0.21
-0.66
58.8
1

-4.24
-4 .4 0 86.3
20.1

0.25
1.45
56.9
1

0.77
1.69
33.3
4.9

-0.95
-2.29*
67.6
2

0.23
0.15
44.1
31.1

-0.42
-1.21
64.7
1

-4.09
-3.74**
85.3
16.2

0.45
1.33
38.2
1

1.26
1.91
35.3
4.9

0.34
0.14
44.0
35.1

-0.09
-0.28
54.0
1

-4.27
-4.37**
84.0
18.0

0.40
1.59
44.0
1

1.60
2.96
26.0
4.9

P anel B: Nontransferable rights offerings (N = 51)
% av erag e abnorm al return
z-value
% of sam ple negative
A verage days in period

0.94
0.22
51.0
60

Panel C: Transferable rights offerings (N = 34)
% av erag e abnorm al return
z-value
% of sam ple negative
A verage days in period

2.11
0.79
41.2
60

P anel D: Rights offerings, less offerings having a previous
rights or firm commitment offering by the sa m e fund (N = 50)
% a v e ra g e abnorm al return
z-value
% of sam ple negative
A veraae davs in Deriod

2.56
0.99
50.0
60

0.09
0.11
44.0
2

The regression model is
7
rjt = C9 + P u S i^ + P a r&

( 1)

Jmdjm + E j,

where rJh rust, and r# are, respectively, daily returns on closed-end fund j , the valueweighted CRSP index, and, for foreign-invested funds only, the dollar-denominated
Morgan Stanley Capital International index for the corresponding country or region. Each
o f seven dummy variables, d^, is set to one during the appropriate time periods, as
described above.
Table 8 shows the results from a separate sample of 12 firm commitment offerings
by closed-end funds. Firm commitment offerings do not have offering periods stretching
over several calendar weeks, as do rights offers. The only event period of interest is a twoday announcement period. The regression model used for the firm commitments therefore
has only a single dummy variable, that being for the announcement period.
Let t be the number o f days in event period n for fund j. Then fund f s total
abnormal return over event period n is given by

This abnormal return is averaged

across funds to get the average abnormal returns shown in the first row of each panel. Most
event periods are of fixed length across funds, except for the pre-offer period and the offer
period. The average length o f each event period across funds is given in Table 7. All
periods and days are trading days, not calendar days.
Estimation is by OLS. The test statistic for each dummy variable (i.e., for each
event period) is
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Table 8-Percent average abnormal stock returns at announcement of
firm commitment offerings
Regression model is Equation (1) in tex t
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant at
the 5% level, and **, a t the 1% level.

(N = 12)

% average abnormal return
z-value
% of sam ple negative

2-day
announcem ent
period
-0.41
-0.51
75.0
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2n

=

(2)

(fjn /tJ in )

with the quantity in the denominator o f the summed term being the OLS estimated
standard error o f the estimate o f g/„.

5.3

Announcement Period Returns
Panel A o f Table 7 indicates that there is no significant market reaction to

announcement o f closed-end fund rights offerings. Table 8 indicates the same result for
closed-end firm commitment offerings, in contrast to the many studies o f industrial firms
that have found significant negative market responses to firm commitment offerings. The
results here are not inconsistent with an adverse selection model o f securities issuance. If,
as argued in Chapter 3, there is little information asymmetry attached to closed-end funds,
then equity issuance will not cause the market to reappraise the fund's value.
In the full sample of rights offer events, there are several offers by funds that had
previously (in the past two years, in most cases) issued equity via either a rights or a firm
commitment offering. The market may partially anticipate these 'repeat' events, thus muting
the two-day announcement returns. The sample of rights offerings in Panel D of Table 7
has been culled o f all 'repeat' events. The results are essentially unchanged. Across all seven
event periods, including the announcement period, the results are very similar between the
full sample and the subsample o f first-occurrence seasoned equity issues.
Panels B and C o f Table 7 break the rights sample into offerings having,
respectively,

nontransferable

and

transferable

rights.

The

average
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abnormal

respectively,

nontransferable

and

transferable

rights.

The

average

abnormal

announcement return is significantly negative (-0.95%, z-value o f >2.29) for transferable
offers, but not for nontransferable offers (+0.40%, z=1.23). Also, 67.6% o f the
transferable returns for the announcement period are negative, compared to only 39.2%
in the nontransferable sample. These results are puzzling, as there is no obvious reason
why only the transferable sample would have significantly negative abnormal returns.
Intuition might suggest the nontransferable sample would have the more negative
responses. Nontransferable rights leave the shareholder without an important option
(the option to sell one's rights), and will for many investors entail higher transactions
costs. It may be the nontransferable sample result that is most in need of an explanation.
The average response from the transferable sample, -0.95%, is o f the same magnitude
reported to what Eckbo and Masulis reported for a sample of uninsured rights offerings
by industrial firms (their result, -1.39%, was marginally insignificant: z-value o f -1.56).
Nontransferable issues (Panel B) have never been studied before.
5.4

Offering Period Returns
The event study results in Table 7 indicate that offering period returns are

significantly negative. Although the event periods corresponding to the first and last days of
the offer period show no abnormal returns, the interim period has an average abnormal
return o f -4.18% for the full sample, and between -4 and -4 _% for the three subsamples
(Panels B, C, and D). For the full sample, 85.9% of the events were negative. This is
consistent with a price pressure effect In Chapter 3, it was argued that the market for
transferable rights, when there is one, tends to decrease the pressure on the underlying
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provides no support for the contention that nontransferable offerings experience more price
pressure than transferable ones. However, the hypothesis stipulated that the comparison
must control for issue size. Larger issues entail more shares being placed, implying more
portfolio rebalancing and higher transactions costs. Table 9 shows a difference in means
test between the transferable and nontransferable samples, using raw, unadjusted returns
from the entire offering period, including the start and expiration days. Table 9 does not
reflect any controls for issue size. Neglecting issue size, there is no significant difference in
offering period returns between transferable and nontransferable offers. Table 10 displays
the results from the OLS regression

rjop — ct + PSIZEj + y TRANSj + £j

(3)

that uses unadjusted offering period cumulative returns, rfJP, as the dependent variable,
with a dummy variable, TRANSj, set to one if rights offering./ has transferable rights. The
other independent variable is the relative issue size, STZEj (calculated as the inverse o f the
allocation ratio). The main effect being investigated in the regression is the difference
between transferable and nontransferable rights. The coefficient on the dummy variable has
the correct sign and a magnitude that would be economically feasible- offering period
returns for transferable offerings are 1.55% greater than for nontransferable offerings.

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 9-Unadjusted cumulative returns during offering periods, for transferable
nontransferable subsamples
Difference in Means t-test,
Two-Sample t-test Assuming Unequal Variances

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
tS ta t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

transferable rights
offerings

nontransfer- able
rights offerings

•0.0291
0.0063
34

-0.0387
0.0030
51

0
54
0.615
0.270
1.674
0.541
2.005
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Table 10-OLS estimates in a cross-sectional regression of raw offering period
cumulative returns against relative issue size and a dummy for rights
transferability

Sample: 34 transferable and 51 nontransferable rights offers.
Regression model :

RjOP « a + b’SIZEj + g*TRANSf + ej

Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, a t the 1% level.

Independent variable
Relative issue size
Transferability of rights

R2
F-value

Coefficient estim ate

t-statistic

(p-value)

-0.0975

-1.90

(0.061)

0.0155

1.06

(0.293)

0.047
2.03
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However, the coefficient is not significant. The model also fails the overall test of
significance, at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the hypothesis that offering period
returns are more negative for nontransferable offers, controlling for issue size, receives
little support from this test.
If temporary price pressure (caused by transactions costs) occurs in rights
offerings, it should be evident as abnormal negative returns during the offering period,
followed by abnormal positive returns after the offer expires. This hypothesis is
distinguished from permanent price pressure (associated with a downward-sloping
demand curve for firm shares) because the latter form of price pressure implies an absence
of price bounceback after the offer expires. If a null hypothesis of no positive abnormal
returns in a post-expiration period can be rejected, such a result would favor temporary
price pressure over permanent pressure. This is Hypothesis #4 of this study.
Post-expiration abnormal returns are shown in the last column of Table 7. For the
full sample and for the no-repeated-events the subsample (Panel D) only, there are
significant positive returns in the first five days after expiration. The magnitude of this
price reversal, though, is less than the negative returns in the offer period (for example,
offering period abnormal returns of negative 4.18% and post-offer abnormal returns of
+0.97%, for the full sample). If the 5-day period captures all of the post-offer price
rebound, then it would appear that there is both a temporary and a permanent component
to the price pressure (since the price never fully recovers). To see whether a longer post
offer period captures a larger price bounce, the entire model, Equation 1, was re-estimated
using a 20-day post-expiration period, instead of 5 days. While the signs and significance
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of the other event period dummies remain unchanged (results not shown), the post
expiration abnormal returns become insignificantly different than zero for the full sample
and all three subsamples. In brief, there is little or no evidence of a price recovery. Thus,
based on the juxtaposition of offering period and post-offer returns, the hypothesis of
permanent (Demand Curve) price pressure cannot be rejected.
As argued in Chapter 3, if there is temporary price pressure during an offering,
then that pressure will be more severe for nontransferable offers. This is because
nontransferable offers impose higher transactions costs on nonparticipating shareholders.
O f course, transactions costs can be avoided by ignoring the rights offer and doing
nothing, but the shareholder will then suffer dilution costs. Price pressure will be closely
related to transactions costs, and potential dilution costs constitute an upper bound on how
much transactions costs one is willing to absorb. For nontransferable offers, and to a lesser
extent for transferable offers, price pressure will be proportional to dilution costs. Dilution
costs, in turn, are proportional to issue size times subscription price discount. Downward
price pressure is measured as negative returns during the offering period. The model is

r jop — oc +

SrZE j )(SUBDISCj ) + £]

(4)

where rjop is the unadjusted cumulative offering period return on fund j, SIZEj is the
relative size of the issue (given by the inverse of the offer’s allocation ratio), and
SUBDISCj is the percentage discount on the subscription price. The regression is run
separately for the transferable and nontransferable samples. The null hypothesis of no
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relation between offer period returns and dilution cost is expected to be rejected only for
the nontransferable sample.
Results of the regressions are shown in Table 11. As expected, there is a
significantly negative relation between offer period returns and dilution costs (t-value = 3.60). The coefficient on the dilution variable is difficult to interpret, as it represents the
product of two other variables. But its magnitude appears to be reasonable in economic
terms. For example, the dilution factor for an offering with a 4:1 allocation ratio and a
10% subscription discount would be (.25)(. 10) = .025 (2.5%). If the discount were then
increased from 10% to 20%, the offering period returns would decrease by an increment of
h(.25)(.20 - .10) = -1.8%.
The tests for price pressure described thus far have involved the offer period and
the immediate post-offer period. The focus on these two time periods in connection with
price pressure is in accordance with some of the existing rights offerings literature (Marsh
(1979), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). It may also be worthwhile to examine the entire
period from just before the announcement date to after expiration. This longer time period
will not capture temporary price pressure effects (a price decline and recovery), as those
effects should occur entirely within a subperiod of the longer period. However, it may
more effectively capture any permanent price pressure phenomenon. At least some
investors who are rebalancing their portfolios to adjust to the new supply of shares may
make purchase, sale, or valuation decisions before the actual offer period. From a rational
expectations perspective, investors' response to the new supply of shares may begin as
early as the announcement of the issue (this view is presented by Hess and Frost (1982)).
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Table 11-OLS estimates in cross-sectional regressions of raw offer period
cumulative returns against the product of relative issue size and relative
subscription price discount. Separate regressions are done for the
nontransferable rights subsample and the transferable rights subsample.
Regression m o d el:

RJOP = a + b*(SI2Ej • SUBDISQ) + ej

Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, a t the
1% level.

Nontransferable rights offers (N=51)

Coefficient estim ate
-0.7042

Independent variable

t-statistic
-3 .6 0 "

(p-value)
(< -01)

(Issue size * subscription discount)
0.210
12.99
R2
F-value

Transferable rights offers (N=34)
Coefficient estim ate

Independent variable

-0.5901

(Issue size * subscription discount)

R2
F-value

t-statistic
-1.54

0.069
2.36
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(p-value)
(0.134)

Of course, there is the risk of conflating information effects from the announcement with
Demand Curve effects. But, as argued, information effects for closed-end funds should be
very modest, in theory. And this study's empirical results supported that theoretical
argument: Table 7 showed an insignificant -.14% announcement period abnormal return
for the full sample of rights offers.
Focusing on a larger time window that may yield insights into permanent price
pressure effects, the average cumulative return on discount/premium is calculated for a
period starting with the last published NAV before issue announcement and ending three
weeks after the offer’s expiration (three weeks after the offer date, in the case of firm
commitment offerings). Using discount/premium returns instead of share returns provides
a measure of the change in demand for fund shares controlling for changes in NAV. It is
the supply of fund shares that is being increased, not the supply of shares in the companies
that are represented in the fund's investment portfolio. Closed-end funds are a class of
assets for which the demand may be highly elastic, if it can be argued that there are many
close substitutes for holding fund shares. Accordingly, there should be no price response
(discount movement) associated with new issues of equity by these funds.
In this regard, discount/premium evidence is presented in Table 12. That table
shows an average discount/premium movement of -4.39% (t-value of -3.95 for the null
hypothesis of a zero movement). If this figure is interpreted as a price response to a change
in share supply, it is large compared to most of the permanent price effects that have been
reported in either the securities issuance literature or the S&P500-additions literature. It is,
however, consistent with the offering period abnormal returns of -4.18% reported in Table
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Table 12-Univariate statistics: cumulative returns on discount/premium portfolios
for 85 rights offerings and 12 firm commitment issuing funds, for the period
starting with the last published NAV before issue announcement and ending with
the first published NAV at least 3 weeks after expiration

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Count
% negative returns

•0.0439
0.0111
•0.0400
0.1090
97
73.2
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7 (which, together with the weak post-offer returns also reported in Table 7, again
suggests a permanent price pressure effect).

5.5

Changes in Ownership Concentration and Trading Volume

Kothare (1997) posits that rights offerings increase ownership concentration, thereby
decreasing trading liquidity, while firm commitment offerings have the opposite effect.
This study’s results along those lines are reported in Table 13. Both the rights sample and
the firm commitment sample exhibit significant increases in trading volume 12 months
after the issuance event compared to same-fund volume 12 months prior to issuance
(significance is obtained using a paired observations t-test as well as a binomial z-test).
However, the increase in trading volume for the firm commitment sample is significantly
more than the increase for the rights sample. This could be interpreted as partial
corroboration of Kothare’s results.
Table 14 reports changes in institutional share ownership for the rights and firm
commitment samples. Neither sample shows a significant change in this type of
ownership, which were at already at low levels, pre-event, for both samples. This result
is not a reflection one way or another on the results of Kothare, who found increases
(decreases) in ownership concentration for firms doing rights (firm commitment)
offerings. The result in Table 14 is simply consistent with this study’s findings (reported
in Chapter 4) that there are also scant insider and blockholder positions in closed-end
funds.
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Table 13-Changes in trading volume of issuing firms' stocks before and after issuance:
8S rights issues versus 12 firm commitment issues.
Log-change = log(total monthly trading volume for the month falling 12
months after issuance / total monthly trading volume for the month falling 12 months
before issuance).
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, a t the 1% level.
C hanges in
trading volume
Rights Offerings (N=85)
M ean log-change
t-statistic
p-value
P ercent firms with increases
Binomial z

0.154
2.135*
0.036
63.53
2.49

Firm commitment offerings (N=12)
Mean log-change
t-statistic
p-value
Percent firms with increases
Binomial z

0.726
3.232**
0.008
83.33
2.31

Difference-in-means test (test whether the m ean log-changes in trading volumes betw een rights
and firm commitment issues are significantly different).
t-statistic

-2.12
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Table 14-Changes in institutional share ownership of issuing firms' stocks before and
after issuance: 85 rights issues versus 12 firm commitment issues.
Changes in the percentage o f shares held by institutions (of the type required to file Form
13's with the SEC), from 12 months before issuance to 12 months after issuance.
Statistical significance indicated by, *, significant a t the 5% level, and **, at the 1% level.
Institutional
ownership
Rights Offerings (N=85)
Pre-issue ownership
Post-issue ownership
C hange in ownership
t-statistic
p-value

11.48
11.04
-0.44
-0.41
0.68

Firm commitment offerings (N=12)
Pre-issue ownership
Post-issue ownership
C hange in ownership
t-statistic
p-value

14.47
13.61
-0.86
-0.36
0.72
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5.6 Evidence on Funds* Choice Between Rights and Firm Commitment Offerings
Recall that, because of the special regulatory constraints under which closed-end
funds operate, these funds do not have a choice between rights and firm commitment
offerings. In order to do a firm commitment offer, the fund’s shares must be trading at or
above net asset value at the time o f the offering. How many funds qualify under this
constraint? And o f those who do qualify to do a firm commitment offering, how many
choose to do so, in preference to a rights offering?
Table 15 shows the mean discount/premia at time of offer announcement for the
rights issuing sample and separately for the firm commitment sample. As expected, 100%
o f the firms announcing for firm commitment offerings were trading at premia to NAV at
the time. However, there were also 42 o f 85 funds from the rights offering group that were
trading at premia to NAV. Yet these 42 funds chose to do rights offerings. O f course some
funds trading just slightly above NAV would not have considered themselves to be
necessarily free to choose a firm commitment. This is due to the possibility that share
price fluctuations could cause the small premium to turn to a small discount between the
time o f announcement and the time the actual offer could be carried out. This
consideration might cause management to desire some cushion. Suppose this cushion is
five percentage points o f premium. Examination of the data show that with this threshold,
26 o f 85 funds (compared to 42 o f 85 when applying a 0% threshold) could have
considered themselves eligible to choose between the two alternative floatation methods.
This still means that in some 2/3 o f the cases where there was a viable choice (i.e., 26
funds chose rights, versus 12 choosing underwritten offers), the funds chose the rights
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Table 15-Premiums and discounts to NAV immediately preceding
announcements, for a sample of 85 rights offerings and 12 firm commitment
offerings.

Firni commitment
offerings:
premia/discounts a t
issue
announcement

Rights offerings:
premia/discounts at
issue
announcement
Mean
Median
Standard Error
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count
% Positive

0.0005
•0.0022
0.01202
0.11272
-0.3024
0.5553
85
49.4%

Mean
Median
Standard Error
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count
% Positive

0.3725
0.2267
0.0895
0.3101
0.1272
0.9816
12
100%
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offer method o f floatation. In addition to foregoing the possible indirect benefits o f firm
commitment offers that are suggested by finance research (Kothare (1997), Slovin,
Sushka, and Lai (1999), Singh (1997)), these funds also sacrificed the much faster time-tomarket, and certainty o f proceeds that only underwritten offers provide.
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CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION

Although there is a small body of literature on the IPO process for closed-end
funds, there has been no examination of seasoned equity issuance by these funds. Closedend funds are a potentially interesting subject in corporate finance because of their
pronounced differences with operating firms: 1) funds make no operating decisions, they
only hold the securities of other companies, 2) the financing decisions of funds are heavily
constrained by statute and regulation, possibly leading these funds to make financing
choices that are not commonly observed elsewhere and are therefore little studied, and 3)
there is evidence that the ownership structure and clientele of closed-end funds differs
from that of operating firms.
hi contrast to industrial firms, but similar to utilities, the shares of closed-end
funds show little reaction to announcements of either rights offerings or firm commitment
offerings. This result fits existing models of securities issuance under conditions of
adverse selection. The market appears to be efficient insofar as, while industrial firms may
hold private information, mutual funds apparently do not. However, contrary to adverse
selection models, and previous evidence on utility companies, funds display strong price
runups prior to issue. These runups coincide with market runups but also reflect strong
relative performance, as evidenced in part by significant positive movements in fund
discounts in the year prior to issue. Fund managers also seem to have 'timing' ability in
that the superior performance does not appear to extend beyond the announcement date.
One interpretation of these phenomena is that fund managers exploit an readily observable
indicator of firm valuation that is not available to the managers of operating firms: the
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fund's discount or premium to net asset value. That is, fund managers tap the capital
markets after the fund’s discount/premium has moved in a positive direction such that the
market can be said to be valuing the firm at more generous than usual levels.
Nontransferable rights have received no attention in the securities issuance
literature. The fact that many closed-end equity issues feature nontransferable rights
affords an opportunity to look for evidence of temporary (transactions costs-based) and
permanent (demand curve) price pressure and to distinguish between the two.
Nontransferable rights should involve higher transactions costs than transferable rights,
hence more price pressure during the offering period. Thus, there is a joint hypothesis that
transactions costs-based price pressure exists during the offering period, and that these
transactions costs are higher when nontransferable rights are involved. This hypothesis is
not supported by comparisons of offering period returns for the two types of rights, using
either an event study regression model, or unadjusted returns during the offer period, or
unadjusted returns controlled for issue size. Together with the finding that announcement
returns are no more negative for nontransferable than for transferable rights (in fact,
nontransferable announcement returns are significantly more positive, a finding for which
no explanation is offered), it appears that nontransferability may have no special harmful
effects on shareholders. For nontransferable but not for transferable rights, offering period
returns are more negative when potential dilution costs are larger. This is the only
evidence that nontransferable rights may involve higher transactions costs.
hi rights offerings, the existence of temporary price pressure is indicated if
negative returns during the offering period are followed by a price recovery after the offer
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expires. This study finds either a partial price recovery (+0.97% for the 5 days after
expiration, compared to negative offering period returns of -4.18%), or no recovery at all
(using 20 days after expiration). This suggests the possible existence of a downward
sloping demand curve for the fund's shares, especially to the extent that the negative
returns are greater than probable transactions costs (Shleifer, 1986). The average -4.39%
return on fund discounts (Table 14) that is found for a more encompassing period from
just before announcement to a point three weeks after expiration provides more supporting
evidence for the permanent price pressure hypothesis. If the idea of permanent price
pressure and a downward-sloping demand curve effect is accepted, there is a corollary
conclusion about the degree of substitutability for the shares of closed-end funds. That is,
there may be a very limited clientele for these funds, and limited substitutability even
between seemingly similar closed-end funds.
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